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TRANSFORMATION AND CONTINUITY OF THE
ARGENTINE WELFARE STATE: EVALUATING
SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM IN THE 1990s
KOICHI USAMI
Beginning after World War II, Argentina institutionalized a limited conservative corpo-
ratist welfare state where occupation-linked social insurance held a central position and
social assistance had a residual character. This was called a limited conservative corpo-
ratist welfare state, because the huge population within the informal sector was excluded
from the main system. A populist government supported by trade unions and the eco-
nomic model of import-substituting industrialization were the background for the for-
mation of this type of welfare state. During the 1990s, elements of a liberal regime were
added to the Argentine welfare state under the reform carried out by the Menem Peronist
government. However, social insurance reform and labor reform were not as drastic as
the economic reform. They still retained a certain continuity from the traditional sys-
tems. The government intended to carry out more drastic social security and labor re-
form, but was unable to do so due to the legacy of corporatism of the Peronist govern-
ment.
INTRODUCTION
THE Peronist government under Carlos Menem, established in 1989, promoteddrastic market-oriented neoliberal economic policies, including theprivatization of state-run corporations and trade liberalization. At the same
time, the government undertook reforms in social policies such as the pension sys-
tem, social health insurance, and the flexibilization of industrial relations, which,
however, turned out to be not as drastically market-oriented as the economic re-
form. The purpose of this article is to review the characteristics of the Argentine
welfare state that was restructured by the social security reform in the 1990s, imple-
mented under the Menem government, and to examine what factors contributed to
its transformation.
With regards to the character of the Argentine social security system, Grassi,
––––––––––––––––––––––––––
The views expressed in the article are solely those of the author and should not be taken as represent-
ing the views of any of the Board of Editors, the Institute of Developing Economies, or the Japan
External Trade Organization.
218 THE DEVELOPING ECONOMIES
Hintze, and Neufeld (1994, p. 15) emphasize such aspects as the interlocking of
social rights1 with formal occupation, and the residual character of social assis-
tance. Many other researchers share Grassi, Hintze, and Neufeld’s view concerning
the character of Argentina’s social security system until the 1980s. The first objec-
tive of this article is to examine the character of the Argentine social security sys-
tem, which was thus formulated by the 1980s and has been transformed by the
reform in the 1990s and thereafter.
The second objective of the article is to examine the factors that contributed to
the formation and transformation of the social security system. Many preceding
studies adopt a method of functionalism under which current social policies are
determined by socioeconomic structures, as seen in the studies of Vilas (1997),
who claims that in Latin America, social policy has been reformed in response to
neoliberal economic policy. However, though this explanation may account for part
of the general trend of social policy formation in Latin America, it can hardly eluci-
date the difference in social policies among countries that have adopted similar
neoliberal economic policies. Esping-Andersen (1990), also criticizing the method
of functionalism2 as being incapable of fully explaining the formation of the present-
day welfare state, stresses the importance of political factors with a central focus on
class coalitions in the formation of welfare states. In Argentina, too, Minujin and
Consentino (1993, p. 47) point to the strong influence of trade unions in the expan-
sion of the social security system, and especially of social insurance. Lo Vuolo and
Barbeito (1993) also argue that the Argentine welfare state, unlike those in Europe,
developed in an environment where democratic elements were scarce, and charac-
terizes the Menem government, which implemented social security reforms in the
1990s, as a delegative democracy. Meanwhile Panizza (2001, p. 179) stresses the
importance of old political system which supported the Menem government and at
the same time influenced the state reforms. In this article, by incorporating those
arguments, we will use political factors as one of the pillars in explaining the back-
ground of the formation of the Argentine welfare state, while giving due attention
to the strength of trade unions and the state of democracy in the 1990s.
However, the intense intervention by the state into the economic process in Ar-
gentina after World War II is such a well-known fact that it is difficult to exclude
economic factors from those that contributed to the formation of the welfare state.
Huber and Stephens (2001) have shown a certain conformity between the theory of
1 According to widely used Marshall’s (1964) definition of social rights, it refers to a wide range of
citizens’ rights from minimum security for life to various economic and social securities for stan-
dard life in the society (p. 72).
2 Criticism of the method of functionalism described by Esping-Andersen is specific both to indus-
trialism and Marxism. For example, it is argued that if the working class is subordinate to the
system, as asserted by the Marxist theory of the welfare state, it is difficult to explain why as much
as 40 per cent of the GNP is spent to legitimize the welfare state (Esping-Andersen 1990, p. 14).
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production regimes and the welfare state. Therefore, we will begin with the meth-
odology of Esping-Andersen and Huber, and incorporate the preceding studies by
Argentine researchers that take into consideration the particularity of Argentina.
From this, we shall put forward and implement an examination of the political
and economic paradigms that existed for each period and examine how the Argen-
tine welfare state was formed and transformed and by what actions of political
agents. To this end, the article is structured as follows: Section I describes the char-
acter of the Argentine social security system from World War II to the 1980s as well
as the factors contributing to its formation; Section II then describes the character-
istics of the social security reform in the 1990s; and Section III attempts to clarify
what factors drove the reform of the social security system in the 1990s and why it
has not been as strongly market-oriented as the economic reform. Incidentally, we
will make an aggregate discussion of elements common throughout Latin America
and those unique to Argentina. Therefore in the final section, we will discuss the
welfare state model common to nearly all the Latin American countries and the
paradigm of political economy that brought about the model as well as, among
others, Argentina’s characteristic social security policies and the distinct paradigm
of political economy that contributed to its formation.
I. FORMATION OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM IN
ARGENTINA AFTER WORLD WAR II
A. Social Security System from World War II to the 1980s
In Argentina, prior to the establishment of the Perón government (1946–55), six
occupation-related pension accounts had been introduced. In 1944, when Juan
Domingo Perón was Secretary of Labor and Social Security, a pension plan for
commercial workers was introduced, and an industrial workers pension plan was
established in 1946, after Perón came to power. In 1954, pension plans for agricul-
tural workers as well for self-employed, managers, and professional workers were
introduced. Thus virtually all working people were placed under the coverage of
public pension plans during the Perón government. In 1956, at the time of the
Aramburu military government, the coverage was further extended to homemaking
service workers. As a result, all working people nominally came to be under the
coverage of the pension system (see Appendix Table).
During the period of the Perón government, the coverage of the pension system
expanded dramatically, but the occupation-related system remained unchanged and
attempts to integrate the plans were unsuccessful (Isuani and San Martino 1993, p.
15). In addition, although the pension system expanded to cover all occupations, it
was mostly civil servants and employees of private companies that actually received
pensions, and there were major disparities with the other occupations (Feldman,
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Golbert, and Isuani 1986, p. 66). During this period, the pension financing system
was moving from a capitalization system to a pay-as-you-go system (Feldman,
Golbert, and Isuani 1986, p. 16). In 1967, under the Onganía military government,
the pension systems were integrated into three major pension accounts: for national
public servants, employee workers, and self-employed workers. The pension-eligi-
bility age was raised, contributions and benefits were standardized, and trade unions
were excluded from the management of the pension system (Table I).
Health insurance systems were also established one by one by occupational cat-
egory under the Perón government. However, the coverage of health insurance did
not reach to all occupational categories at that time. The development of heath
insurance took place in parallel with the development of the public hospital system
providing medical services free of charge, in principle, to the entire population. The
health insurance coverage expanded dramatically in 1970, when the Social Health
Insurance Law was legislated by the Onganía military government. Under the law,
all employees had to be enrolled in the health insurance system, and trade unions
were admitted as health insurance administrators together with the government and
state-run and mixed enterprises (Anales 1970, pp. 180–85). As a result, many health
insurance were operated by trade unions.
In addition, the worker’s accident compensation insurance was introduced by
law for the first time in 1915, and in 1955 its coverage was extended to all employ-
ees by the Lonardi military government (Enciclopedia juridical OMEGA 1979, pp.
21, 30). The family allowance system in Argentina is operated as a form of social
insurance. The system was first introduced for certain occupational categories in
1945, when Perón was Secretary of Labor and Social Security, and in 1957 at the
time of the Aramburu military government, the participation of commercial and
TABLE  I
COVERAGE OF THE PENSION SYSTEM
(1,000 persons)
Male Female
Population Population Total Beneficiary Coverage
(Age 60–) (Age 55–) (%)
1950 613 882 1,495 188 12.59
1955 754 1,082 1,836 473 25.76
1960 912 1,324 2,236 749 33.51
1965 1,069 1,604 2,674 1,086 40.62
1970 1,224 1,899 3,123 1,390 44.52
1975 1,376 2,198 3,575 1,695 47.41
1980 1,521 2,518 4,039 2,342 58.00
1985 1,686 2,842 4,528 2,759 60.93
1990 1,858 3,119 4,977 3,031 60.90
Source: Isuani and San Martino (1993, p. 19).
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industrial workers became obligatory. Then, in 1968 under the Onganía military
government, it was expanded to cover national and local civil servants (Sardegna
1989). The unemployment insurance system, though available in some exceptional
cases, was not universally available until the enactment of the Employment Law in
1991.
As a matter of course, social insurance was for formal sector workers, and em-
ployees were particularly privileged. Self-employed workers were virtually blocked
from all social insurance other than pension. The coverage of social insurance peaked
in the 1980s at about 60 per cent (Isuani and San Martino 1993, p. 19), while health
insurance coverage, since posting 67 per cent in 1971, has continued to decline to
44.8 per cent in 1996 (Grassi, Hintze, and Neufeld 1994, p. 135; ANSSAL 1997,
pp. 103, 123). As described above, 30–40 per cent of the population is not covered
by the social insurance system, though its share of public social expenditures is
large. In 1980, public social expenditures accounted for 16.9 per cent of GDP, with
56.75 per cent and 43.25 per cent of this sum coming, respectively, from the social
insurance sector and social sector sharing (de Flood 1999, p. 74), indicating the
majority of the expenditures were for social insurance. In other words, the social
insurance system developed after World War II came to form the core of the country’s
social security system, but was an occupation-related system targeting only the
formal sector. There was a distinct stratification between the formal and informal
sectors and even within the formal sector there was a stratification among occupa-
tions.
As for social assistance, a universal system prevailed throughout the develop-
ment process, with the social sector being financed basically by fiscal expenditures
and with the entire population as a target. A breakdown of the social sector in 1980
shows that education and culture combined accounted for 48 per cent, almost half
of the expenditures. The largest expenditure in the social sector other than educa-
tion is medical care (health), which accounts for 19 per cent (Figure 1). The central
part of this system is the public hospital system that in principle provides the entire
population with treatment free of charge. When Carrillo (1974, pp. 362–63) was
serving as Minister of Health during the Perón government, the number of public
hospitals was dramatically expanded, from 50 state hospitals with 15,000 beds in
1946 to 125 hospitals and 25,000 beds in 1951. As mentioned above, during the
Perón government, medical policy was developed through the parallel building of
the occupation-related health insurance and the universal public hospital system.
Consequently, however, the medical system in Argentina gradually became stratified,
so that employees in the formal sector used health insurance, while the people in
the informal sector used public hospitals and the middle to upper class used private
medical service and insurance.
Other public social assistance policies were traditionally driven by charity orga-
nizations, but the public system expanded beginning with the establishment of the
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Eva Perón Foundation that took on a public nature, with the foundation having a
large impact on the character of the subsequent social assistance policies. The foun-
dation established in 1948, and was led by Eva Perón. It was financed from public
fund and donations from trade unions and others. The foundation provided low-
income populations with monetary as well as in-kind assistance (clothes and food).
The foundation also enlarged its operation into areas such as nursing homes, non-
contribution pension benefits to those over age sixty with no assets and no pension
plans, facilities for children, housing construction for low-income populations, hos-
pitals, and shelters for female workers with economic and social problems (Ferioli
1990). Though the social assistance activities of the foundation were significant in
the sense that social assistance is operated by the public sector, they entailed the
following problems. Firstly, the activities of the foundation were not institutional-
ized compared with the social insurance sector and characteristically lacked plan-
ning. This became a prototype for subsequent social assistance policies, which tended
to have a residual and fragmented character compared with social insurance. This is
also reflected on social assistance expenditures: in 1980, while social insurance
expenditures made up 9.13 per cent of GDP, expenditures for the items comparable
to social assistance were only 0.52 per cent of GDP (de Flood 1999, pp. 74–76).
Secondly, it could be pointed out that a patron-client relationship was estab-
lished between Eva Perón and the beneficiaries of social assistance. For instance,
Fig. 1. Public Social Expenditure in the Social Sector in 1980
Source: de Flood (1999, p. 74).
Water supply and
sewage 4%
Housing 12%
Social assistance 7%
Employment 1%
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Education
and culture
48%
Health 19%
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the procedure of applying for non-contribution pension involved either directly asking
Eva or writing a letter to the foundation or to the official residence of the president,
which inherently implies a risk of arbitrary administration (Ferioli 1990, p. 36;
Usami 2001a, p. 25). Here again we see a prototype of clientelism in social assis-
tance policy, which is still observed today.
Rather than public social assistance of a residual nature, it was family and women
that shouldered the care for the elderly, infants, and children. The rate of female
labor participation in 1947, during the period of import-substituting industrializa-
tion, was 23.4 per cent, and even in 1980 it was still only 26.9 per cent (Torrado
1992, p. 92), indicating the existence of a gender division of labor, with men as
breadwinners and women taking charge of domestic duties including care, contin-
ued in a clear-cut form. The wealthy, on the other hand, partially procured care
from the market by hiring domestic service employees. As described above, social
assistance until the 1980s was residual, while retaining the character of clientelism
and familism.3
B. Political Economy Paradigm for the Formation of the Social Security System
Examining the contributing factors to the social security system until the 1980s,
the following economic factors are identified: The Argentine economic develop-
ment model after World War II can be described as one of import-substituting in-
dustrialization, which was placed as the foundation for the economic development
of the country. With a view to driving forward import-substituting industrialization,
the state aggressively intervened into the economy and promoted the industrializa-
tion of relevant sectors. The policy of import-substituting industrialization, though
varying to some extent in its response to foreign capital and in the degree of trade
liberalization, was maintained for a prolonged period until the 1980s throughout
the period of the Perón government and the other civilian and military regimes,
with the exception of the military government between 1976 and 1983.
The promotion of import-substituting industrialization was closely linked to the
following political factor: One of the reasons for the Perón government’s promo-
tion of import-substituting industrialization was to prevent the radicalization of the
labor movement by securing full employment. For example, in 1944, Perón wrote
in one of his books, “if the economic order introduced by the state develops produc-
tion, distribution and circulation, and is directed to the maintenance of social order
and the prosperity of each social group, only then shall social problems be appro-
priately solved” (Rousselot 1997, p. 22). Meanwhile, one of the important motiva-
tions behind many of the policies taken by the Perón government toward workers
3 The Eva Perón Foundation was dissolved by the military following the coup d’état in 1955 and
most of its activities were transferred to the current Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Social
Development.
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was the deterrence of the radicalization of the labor movement (Usami 2001a, pp.
11–13). In other words, the Perón government tried to conciliate the labor force by
promoting import-substituting industrialization and through social security poli-
cies for workers.
The promotion of import-substituting industrialization and the enlargement of
the state brought about an expansion of stable employment. As a result, workers
were organized and trade unions expanded. The number of union members increased
from 500,000 in 1945 to 3 million in 1951 (Santos Martínez 1988, p. 315). It is true
that the trade unions that grew during this process became a major base of support
for the Perón government, and that Perón himself envisioned a state corporatism
that would control those trade unions from above. Unlike in Mexico, where peas-
ants’ associations are as significant as those of workers, state corporatism under the
Perón government was characterized by having the relationship with trade unions
at its center, as the military and churches had gradually estranged themselves from
the government. However, this does not mean that trade unions were completely
controlled from above, and it cannot be denied that unions maintained a certain
autonomy. For instance, in 1954, the unions of metal industry, contrary to the deci-
sion of the government and the General Confederation of Workers not to increase
wages, conducted sporadic strikes demanding a wage hike (Luna 1992, p. 804).
There were also occasions when union executives were forced to resign or the gov-
ernment and the management were compelled to compromise due to demands from
the ranks and files of the unions (Gaggero 1997, p. 174; Auyero 1997, pp. 208–9).
The development of social insurance during the Perón government was presumably
thus realized as a benefit provided by the state with the intention to control trade
unions from above, and as a concession to trade unions, which maintained a certain
autonomy (see Figure 2).
After the fall of the Perón government, therefore, workers in the formal sector
continued to be given dual protection, with their wage and employment guaranteed
by import-substituting industrialization and by the enlarged state, and also with the
protection given by social insurance that had developed. Meanwhile, people in the
informal sector, who had been left out of the benefits of import-substituting indus-
trialization, engaged in unstable and low-wage employment. They were not cov-
ered by any social insurance linked with stable employment, and only received the
above-mentioned social assistance of residual character. During the Perón govern-
ment, however, as a result of the active propaganda that Eva was on the side of the
poor and that policies for the poor were being actively implemented by her, many
of the informal sector population were incorporated into the support base of the
Peronist Party. However, in comparison with the relationship between organized
trade unions and the government, where the demand and support relationship is
organizational and explicit, that between the benefits given to the unorganized in-
formal sector population and their voting for the government as a trade-off was
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Fig. 2. Transformation of the Welfare State in Argentina
Source: By the author.
Notes: 1. Lines indicate relationship between agents. Line
thickness indicates relational strength.
2. Organizational relation.
Nonorganizational relation.
Agents.
Social security system.
( ) Respective characteristics.
B.  Market-oriented conservative and corporatist welfare state after the 1990s
A. Limited conservative and corporatist welfare state during the period of
import-substituting industrialization
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nothing more than an “estimation” (Auyero 1997, p. 179).4 Hence, support from
the low-income population for the Peronist Party as a trade-off for social assistance
is ambiguous, and the relationship must be studied more cautiously, as Auyero stated
in his study (Auyero 2000, p. 217).
Secondly, as mentioned in Section I.A, it should be noted that even during the
military government period, the social insurance system expanded to a non-negli-
gible level. The military, from before World War II, had been interested in industri-
alization from the viewpoint of national security. Except for the military regime
from 1976 to 1983, which promoted neoliberal policies, the military governments
promoted import-substituting industrialization and the military itself directly and
indirectly managed a group of large-scale heavy and chemical industries under the
General Direction of Munitions Industry. There are two main views as to why the
social insurance system developed during a period of military governments. The
first emphasizes the role of technocrats under the autonomous military governments.
Malloy (1979, p. 144), using an example from Brazil, writes that “the orientation
and goals of the military regime converged with those of the social insurance tech-
nocrats to create an alliance willing and able to impose a systematic reform of
social insurance system.” The move in 1967 of the Onganía military regime to re-
move trade unions from the management of pension system when it integrated the
pension systems, which until then had been segmentalized by occupational cat-
egory, can be seen as an example of this.
The second is to view it as a concession to the powerful labor unions. In May
1969, in Cordoba, Argentina’s second largest city, large-scale anti-military protest
activities were launched by trade unions and students. The military regime sup-
pressed the anti-military-regime movement using armed force, but this led to a
weakening of its prestige and to a surge in anti-military regime mobilization (Brennan
1996). In the following year, 1970, the Onganía military regime enacted the Social
Medical Insurance Law, making it compulsory for every employee worker to par-
ticipate in health insurance, and even gave trade unions permission to manage health
insurance. This can be regarded as a conciliatory measure by the military regime to
appease the strong and autonomous power of unions.
II. SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM IN THE 1990S
A. Social Insurance Reform in the 1990s
The Carlos Menem Peronist government, established in 1989, undertook a full-
fledged, market-oriented, and neoliberal economic reform, but also carried out re-
forms in the area of social security and labor.
4 Auyero stated this comment based on his survey during the 1990s. Although his suggestion seems
to be adequate for the period of the Perón government.
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Pension system. To begin with, we will look into the reform of the pension sys-
tem, which accounts for a large portion of expenditures. Following the economic
crisis in the 1980s, the traditional pay-as-you-go pension system was suffering from
worsening deficits in accounting, leading to frequent delays or shortages of the
benefit payments; the shortage of contributions was compensated for by govern-
ment expenditures. There were criticisms that the pay-as-you-go system had be-
come unable to cope with the aging population, thus leading to expanding deficits
and encouraging early retirement, because of its generous benefit level and the fact
that the contribution-benefit relationship was ambiguous, which led to a higher rate
of evasion of contributions. These criticisms were in line with the World Bank’s
recommendation concerning pension reform (World Bank 1994).
The pension reform bill, which gave rise to vigorous debates within and outside
the Congress, was enacted in September 1993, though with major amendments to
the original government proposal that workers aged forty-five or lower participate
in the private capitalization pension system to receive supplementary pensions (Isuani
and San Martino 1993, pp. 85–93). Essentially, it consisted of a public basic pen-
sion under a pay-as-you-go system available to the entire population, coupled with
either a supplementary pension from the pay-as-you-go system or the private capi-
talization system, and each individual was given the right to choose between these
two. As for financing, the beneficiary and the employer contributed 11 per cent and
16 per cent of the wage, respectively and self-employed people contributed 27 per
cent of profit. In 1999 there were 10.16 million participants in the pension system,
of which 22.3 per cent were using the supplementary pension under the pay-as-
you-go system, while a majority of 77.7 per cent had chosen the private capitaliza-
tion pension for their supplementary pension. Yet, compared with the pension re-
form in Chile, where there had been a nearly complete shift to a private capitalization
system, and in Mexico, where private-sector employees had almost totally shifted
to the private capitalization system, the reform in Argentina resulted in an eclectic
system consisting of a basic pension under the pay-as-you-go system, common to
all participants, and a supplementary pension, chosen from either a public pay-as-
you-go system or a private capitalization system.
However, from 1999, as a countermeasure to the recession, the employers’ con-
tribution was cut from 11 per cent to 5 per cent of the wage, and the weight of the
state’s contribution to the public pension system including government debt for the
transition cost from the pay-as-you-go system to the private capitalization system5
5 In shifting from the public pension under a pay-as-you-go system to a private capitalization sys-
tem, the contributions of active workers and employers are accumulated by a private capitalization
method and therefore the benefits paid under the plan had to be funded by the government. This is
called the government debt of the transition cost from the pay-as-you-go system to the private
capitalization system.
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increased from 39.1 per cent in 1994 to 69.9 per cent in 2000.6 Furthermore, due to
the deteriorating economic conditions, only 46.8 per cent of the participants were
actually paying the premium in 2000.7 The premium contribution rate is estimated
to be higher among employed workers, and lower among the self-employed, result-
ing in the higher pension coverage of employees in the formal sector. In 1996, the
average pension benefit for employee workers per month was 463.38 pesos (1
peso = U.S.$1), whereas that for self-employed was 200.59 pesos, indicating a more
than twofold difference between employees and self-employed workers.8
Health insurance. Health insurance reform was also vigorously debated under
the Menem government. Criticisms were raised against the existing system, argu-
ing that the market mechanism does not function under the occupation-linked sys-
tem, which is inefficient and lacks incentives for service improvements (Panadeiro
1991, pp. 45–53). Active debates were launched within and outside the Congress
concerning health insurance reform, with a focus on an optional system of health
insurance, involving insurance operating trade unions. Finally, in January 1997, a
free optional system was implemented on condition that private health insurance
would not be included as an option in the system. Here again, in comparison with
Chile, where the choice of private health insurance is open (Barrientos 2000, pp.
94–100), the health insurance reform under the Menem government was not thor-
oughgoing, as exemplified by the fact that private health insurance was excluded
from the available options and that trade unions were granted the right to operate
health insurance.
Under the free optional system, members as families are allowed to change their
health insurance once a year, and health insurance must provide an obligatory medical
program to new members. By May 1998, 8 per cent of insured families had changed
their health insurance. In December 2000, the alliance government of De la Rua, by
presidential decree, implemented a reform to include private health insurance as an
option.9 Trade unions, including the General Confederation of Workers, fiercely
resisted and launched a general strike (La Nación, January 9, 2001).
The problem facing health insurance, as with the pension system, is the declin-
ing rate of participation accompanying the destabilization of employment. Health
insurance coverage, based on the Social Medical Insurance Law, increased to 67.0
per cent in 1971 and plunged to 44.8 per cent in 1996 (Grassi, Hintze, and Neufeld
1994, p. 135; ANSSAL 1997, pp. 103, 123). However, if the figure is adjusted to
include those covered by other social insurance by provinces, cities, the military,
6 According to the documents of the Ministry of Treasury, 2000.
7 According to the documents of the Secretary of Social Security, 2001.
8 According to the documents of the Secretary of Social Security, 2001.
9 In reality, private insurance companies have little enthusiasm for entering the system; only 10 per
cent of insurers have shown an interest in the entry (La Nación, January 3, 2001).
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etc., the figure of social health insurance coverage seems to be more than 10 per-
centage points higher.
Family allowance system. In 1992, the family allowance system operated by so-
cial insurance was merged with the pension system. As a result, allowances for
spouses and for large families were abrogated and qualifications for child allow-
ance were tightened (Golbert 2000, pp. 88–89). This was partly a reform directed
toward stimulating women’s participation in the labor market, but it was also a
response to the requirement for bringing social insurance financing to a sound foot-
ing. In 1995, workers’ accident compensation insurance was reformed, and today it
is effectively run by private insurers.
Unemployment insurance system. The unemployment insurance system was in-
troduced in 1991 through the enactment of the Employment Law, which was de-
signed to promote the increased flexibility of industrial relations. Prior to this, un-
employment insurance only existed in special cases. With the revision of the Law
of Labor Contract in 1991 and 1995, limited-term labor contracts, extensions of the
period of experiment, and part-time labor contracts were admitted under the labor-
management agreement. However, during the period of the Menem government,
decentralization of labor-management negotiation was not achieved, that the del-
egation of authority was not moved from central negotiations to negotiations by
plant or company, due to the opposition of trade unions (Font 1997; Madrid and
Caubet 1996). The introduction of unemployment insurance, along with the
flexibilization of industrial relations, signifies a destabilization in employment as
viewed from workers. This indicates that a major legislative transformation of in-
dustrial relations took place in the country.
As we have seen, in the 1990s initiatives were taken to introduce the market
mechanism into the social insurance system, in accordance with the recommenda-
tions of international financial institutions. Rather than shifting completely to the
market-oriented format, however, Argentina has moved in the direction of retaining
traditional forms for both the pension and health insurance, and then applying a
market-oriented system to the traditional forms. Although social insurance remains
the core of the social security system in Argentina, there has been an increase in the
rate of the people who are beyond the reach of social insurance coverage due to
increased unemployment and unstable employment.
B. The Social Assistance System in the 1990s: Civil Society, Familism, and
Clientelism
The following three characteristics can be used to describe social assistance poli-
cies in the 1990s and subsequent years.
First of all, taking the example of the Food Assistance Program, which is at the
core of the social assistance program, there is still criticism concerning political
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clientelism. In 1990, a system of coupons (solidarity certificates) was introduced
for exchange with food, and there were high expectations for more effective man-
agement of the program, but it is now viewed as a failure due to corruption and
political abuse of the system (Nogueira 1995, p. 49).
A food assistance program has also been implemented at the provincial level,
which includes a life plan (plan vida), commonly called “Manzanera,” that is still
(as of 2003) being implemented by the province of Buenos Aires. The program
began in the latter half of the 1990s, under the supervision of the Provincial Council
for Family and Human Development, with Chiche Hilda Duhalde, the wife of the
then governor, as the honorary director general of the program. In carrying out its
operations, the provincial government first has a city designate its poorest district.
Then, middle organizations such as women’s centers, churches, or association of
pensioners, appoint one female supervisor (Manzanera) and her deputy for each
four blocks (Manzana). As many as 17,000 women are appointed, and given charge
of organizing their districts, through which milk and cereal are distributed to preg-
nant women and children aged five and younger. The program had as many as
600,000 beneficiaries, and the budget for the program in 1996 was 385,000 pesos
(1 peso = U.S.$1) (Clarín, January 27, 1997).
This Manzanera program, though organized from above, is the biggest of the
programs run with the participation of residents’ organizations in distressed dis-
tricts. When the program functions effectively, the expectation is that the social
assistance is provided appropriately in response to the real needs of the community.
Yet, criticisms have been raised toward the Manzanera program concerning, for
example, its murky money flow, the existence of political clientelism, and its
familism-influenced nature, which imposes child rearing upon women only (Clarín,
January 27, 1997; La Nación, August 30, 1997; Auyero 1997, 2000; Cravino et al.
2002). In other programs, as well, some federal legislators have been accused by
the media of having acted as go-betweens for social assistance and the administra-
tion (La Nación, May 27, 2002). As we have seen above, the term “political
clientelism” has to be treated cautiously, but these criticisms confirm the existence
of some kind of political clientelism associated with social assistance even at the
level of federal legislators.
Secondly, while political clientelism remains in the food assistance program, a
new trend can be observed toward transparency and efficiency in social assistance
and the utilization of NGOs and other citizens’ organizations. While the Ministry of
Social Development (the former Secretary of Social Development) is in charge of
social assistance at the federal government level, a System of Information, Monitor
and Evaluation of the Programs concerning Social Development (SIEMPRO) has
been put in place with the support of the World Bank to evaluate disclosure and, in
part, effectiveness concerning various programs undertaken by the ministry. It has
been pointed out that in its background lies the fact that these social assistance
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execution organizations have come to be decentralized into municipal or provincial
departments in charge of social affairs, and that many community organizations are
taking part in their implementation (Secretary of Social Development 1998, p. 3).
In other words, as social assistance enforcement organizations are decentralized
from the federal government to regional and civil organizations, it has become ever
more necessary to have information concerning the above and to evaluate the social
assistance programs they execute.
Meanwhile, there have been proposals to enhance targeting in order to clarify
who should be the targets of social assistance. The United Nations Economic Com-
mission for Latin America and the Caribbean (CEPAL 1995, pp. 27–34) recom-
mends that targeting be strengthened so that resources can be provided quickly and
without fail to the target population. This, however, is supposed to be implemented
through non-bureaucratic organizations, i.e., civil organizations, which, the com-
mission believes, can enhance the legitimacy of the state with regard to the poorest
population. Criticism has been raised against such recommendations for enhanced
targeting, claiming that they would only encourage social discrimination and would
not solve poverty itself (Salama and Valier 1996, pp. 152–57).
Thirdly, we can cite the existence of familism, in that women still play a large
role in the care sector. In the 1990s, female participation in the labor market in-
creased sharply. However, the traditional familist character of social assistance,
though weakened somewhat, basically remained unchanged during this period. The
only change was that women were now required to perform both family care and
work, as flexible work emerged. Furthermore, middle- and upper-class women who
ventured into the labor market became more dependent on the market, as they hire
domestic service employees to partly take care of domestic work and family care
on their behalf.
Fourthly, in the health sector, as described in the preceding section, stratification
became increasingly apparent, as high-income earners began to use private medical
organizations and insurance, a majority of employees used social health insurance,
while the low-income population relied upon free public hospitals.
III. TRANSFORMATION OF THE POLITICAL ECONOMY PARADIGM:
THE FACTORS OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM IN THE 1990S
A. Transformation of the Economic Paradigm: Conversion to a Market-Oriented
Model
The transformation of the economic development model can be cited as the larg-
est factor behind the transformation of the social security regime. The economic
crisis of the 1980s, triggered by the problem of the huge external debt and fiscal
deficit, became so serious that 5,000 per cent per annum hyperinflation was posted
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in 1989. Under such circumstances, and following the de-facto collapse of the
Alfonsín Radical government, the Menem Peronist government came to power in
July 1989, earlier than the scheduled inauguration. The biggest political challenge
imposed upon the government was to put an end to the inflation and stabilize the
economy. The ruling Peronist Party, with the support of General Confederation of
Workers, the only national labor center in the country, was regarded as a histori-
cally representative populist party of Latin America.
Immediately after its inauguration, the Menem government introduced a social
pact between the government, labor, and capital, and implemented the compulsory
conversion of fixed deposits to government bonds to offset the fiscal deficit in an
attempt to stabilize the economy. Yet, the year 1990 saw 1,344 per cent per annum
inflation. The “heterodox method” failed to achieve economic stabilization. There-
fore, starting in 1990, economic policy was drastically transformed toward the adop-
tion of market-oriented neoliberal economic policies. Trade was liberalized, the
average tariff was lowered from 39 per cent in 1988 to 10 per cent in November
1992, and quantitative trade restriction were in practice lifted, with a major excep-
tion being made for cars (Usami 1993, p. 6). In addition, most state-run corpora-
tions were privatized and the share of public sector diminished in the economy as
well as a source of employment. Through this liberalization policy, the economic
development model was transformed from one based on import-substituting indus-
trialization to a market-oriented model operated in line with the market mecha-
nism. With regard to the currency system, the Convertibility Law was introduced in
1991, introducing a fixed exchange rate system of one U.S. dollar to the peso and
appropriating foreign currency reserves for new currency issue.
The introduction of a market-oriented model and the flexibilization of industrial
relations mentioned in the preceding section signified the loss of the guarantee of
employment and wages that had been enjoyed by the formal sector workers under
the import-substituting industrialization. The “dual guarantee” refers to the guaran-
tee of employment and wages under the protectionist policy of import-substituting
industrialization and by the state that grew along with the former policy, as well as
the legal framework of labor and social security–related laws that protected work-
ers with regular employment contracts. Consequently, in the labor market in the
1990s, the distinction between formal sector and informal sector was becoming
vague in terms of employment stability and social security. The employment situa-
tion was also deteriorating. Even in the 1980s, when economic crisis was rampant,
unemployment had hovered around 5 per cent. In the 1990s, by contrast, the rate
remained at a high level of 15 per cent, indicating permanent heavy unemployment
(INDEC 2002).
The social security and labor reforms of the 1990s appear to have taken place in
line with the conversion of the economic development model to a market-oriented
one. The partial introduction of the private capitalization system into the pension
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system invigorated the capital market, and was in conformity with flexible indus-
trial relations. The optional system for health insurance was also based on the mar-
ket mechanism, and was intended to introduce competition among insurance cor-
porations and medical service providers to achieve higher efficiency and improved
services. The introduction of unemployment insurance was essential, since indus-
trial relations were becoming flexible and the risk of unemployment had increased.
Social assistance was also needed to ensure that the market mechanism would not
be hampered by social unrest caused by a rising unemployment rate. The enhanced
targeting of social assistance and expanded participation of the civil sector were
coherent with the objective of realizing efficient social assistance and a small gov-
ernment.
However, as we saw in Section II, social security and labor reforms were not as
far-reaching as the economic reform, since they only involved the partial introduc-
tion of the market mechanism and competitive principles into traditional systems.
Here, a question remains: Why were many of the old systems kept intact? And
another question emerges: Why was the government, which was backed by trade
unions, able to implement labor and social security reforms that trade unions op-
posed? To answer these questions, we need to analyze some political factors.
B. Transformation of the Political Paradigm: Delegative Democracy and the
Legacy of Corporatism
The planners of the neoliberal reforms within the Menem government in the
1990s included Domingo Cavallo, Minister of the Economy, Carlo Figueroa, Min-
ister of Labor and Social Security, and Carola Pessino, Advisor to the Minister of
Labor and Social Security, all of whom were researchers influenced by neoclassical
economics, and with no connection to the Peronist Party. These neoliberal techno-
crats came to demonstrate their own true abilities after the failure of the policies
initiated by Minister of the Economy Erman Gonzáles, a traditional Peronist Party
member, and after seeing signs of a rekindling of hyperinflation in 1990 (Palermo
and Novaro 1996, p. 294).
Similarities can be pointed out between the character of the Menem government,
which made use of neoliberal technocrats to push the economic and social security
reforms in the 1990s, and the idea of delegative democracy as proposed by O’Donnell
(1999). He defines delegative democracy as a form of democracy that consists of
“constituting, through clean elections, a majority that empowers one to become, for
a given number of years, the embodiment and interpreter of the high interests of the
nation” and to be given an authority independent of other organizations (p. 164).
He argues that such a strong president can protect technocrats against various forms
of opposition from the society. In the case of Argentina, the Peronist Menem won
an overwhelming victory in the presidential election in 1989 over Anleloz, the can-
didate of the Radical Party. In the first half of the 1990s, the ruling Peronist Party
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held an absolute majority both in the upper and lower houses of the Congress. With
the backing of the strong support of the people and by an absolute majority in the
Congress, immediately after the inauguration, the Congress approved State Reform
Law (Ley de Reforma del Estado) and Economic Emergency Law (Ley de
Emergencia Económica), giving the president powerful authority concerning eco-
nomic and social security reforms (Blutman 1998, pp. 25-31). Furthermore, a con-
stitutional revision in 1994 enabled the president to issue presidential decrees if
urgently needed and to promote various reforms without deliberations in the Con-
gress. This, in turn, put pressure upon the Congress to approve the reform bills.
The neoliberal economic reforms implemented by the Menem government were
unpopular not only among the organized workers in the formal sector but also among
low-income populations due to its idea of fair pricing, which meant an increase in
public utility rates. However, as pointed out by many researchers, the economic
turmoil in the 1980s and the rekindled inflation in the early days of the Menem
government brought about a situation where the government forced its support base
to accept harsh policies (Battistini 1999, p. 274; Alonso 2000, p. 199). In addition,
given employment insecurity deriving from economic liberalization, the privatization
of public corporations, flexibilization of industrial relations, and the permanence of
massive unemployment, the political power of trade unions seems to have declined.
According to ILO statistics (1997, pp. 237–40), Argentine trade union density
plunged by 42.6 per cent from 1985 to 1995, and the influence of trade unions was
apparently weakened by the split in 1989 of the pro-Peronist CGT (General Con-
federation of Workers).
Why, then, were trade unions able to win larger concessions in the labor and
social security reforms than in the economic reform headed by trade liberalization?
Within the pension system, the pay-as-you-go system that trade unions supported
remained for the basic pension, with an optional public supplementary pension
system. In the case of health insurance reform, trade unions continued to be al-
lowed to operate health insurance, and private health insurance was excluded from
the available options in the system, as was demanded by trade unions. With regard
to the labor reform, as well, the delegation of authority for negotiations at the re-
gional or company levels did not materialize during the Menem government.
Let us examine the background to the reforms, using the example of the health
insurance reform. Health insurance was directly linked with the interests of trade
unions, as many health insurance corporations were directly managed by trade
unions. The medical reform bill was first submitted to the Congress in 1992, but
failed to be enacted due to the opposition of trade unions and pro-union legislators
in the ruling Peronist Party (Belmartino 1995, p. 21). Subsequently, the Menem
government, in an attempt to bring about the reform by decree, proclaimed Presi-
dential Decree No.9 and No.576 in 1993, but neither was executed because of op-
position from trade unions (Usami 2001b, pp. 287–90). The World Bank, which
235ARGENTINA
supported health insurance reform, expressed concerns over the delay in Argentina
(Clarín, December 3, 1996). During this period, negotiations between the govern-
ment and CGT were being held continuously outside the Congress. In the final
phase of the negotiations, toward the end of 1996, trade unions demanded that the
optional system of health insurance be postponed by one year and that private health
insurance be excluded from it (Clarín, December 14, 1996).
On January 1, 1997, however, the government forced through the health insur-
ance reform, and the CGT resisted by bringing suit against the government (Clarín,
January 3, 1997). Here again, there was a sharp confrontation between the presi-
dent, who wanted to promote radical reform, and the fiercely opposing trade unions.
In the end, a compromise agreement was reached, partially integrating views of the
government and CGT. The optional system of health insurance was executed, but
private health insurance was left out from the available options (La Nación, January
25, 1997). With regard to pension and labor reforms, trade unions won certain con-
cessions through negotiations with the government, or by exerting pressure through
strikes.
Thus, trade unions were able to win greater concessions in the social insurance
and labor reforms than in the economic reforms, which were drastic, because the
CGT remained the biggest support organization of the Peronist Party and despite its
weakened political influence, it was almost impossible to carry out policies in com-
plete disregard of its demands. The Menem government’s social insurance and la-
bor reforms were backed by the powerful presidential authority of delegative de-
mocracy as presented by O’Donnell (1997). However, they were far from what the
government originally hoped for, and were also affected by restrictions originating
in the legacy of corporatism, where the government sat at the negotiating table with
trade unions, while unions put pressure on the government by strikes and other
measures. As a result, reform could not move forward unless the original plan of
the government was revised by the government-labor agreement. In other words,
the social insurance and labor reforms of the Menem government moved forward
under the influence of regulations coming from two directions, one by the powerful
executive branch of the government trying to promote market-oriented reforms and
the other by the legacy of corporatism of negotiating with trade unions, who were
weakened but still retained a certain political influence.
FINAL REMARKS
Returning finally to the argument of Esping-Andersen regarding clusters of regimes
in the welfare state,10 as mentioned in Introduction, the Argentine welfare state
10 Esping-Andersen’s theory of the welfare state regime makes no distinction between the discussion
of clusters of regimes of the social security system and of the welfare state including the political
factors contributing to its formation. Therefore, here, the cluster of regimes in social security is
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regime since World War II has been similar to conservative and corporatist welfare
regimes, in that occupation-linked social insurance is at the core, social insurance
benefits are stratified by occupations, and social assistance is residual, with a
familistic characteristic where care is a burden for women. However, in the sense
that the target of social insurance benefits is limited to the formal sector and that the
broad informal sector is effectively excluded from the social insurance system, it
may well be described as a limited conservative and corporatist welfare regime.
With the reform in the 1990s, elements of a liberal welfare regime were added to
the limited conservative corporatist welfare regime. It may also be described as a
market-oriented conservative corporatist welfare regime. However, the transforma-
tion of the Argentine welfare state regime has been driven, by factors different from
those in the Western political world, in that the welfare regime was determined, by
the formation of a specific class-political coalition based around the labor move-
ment as asserted by Esping-Andersen. In the background of the transformation of
the welfare state regime, we can point to a shift of the political and economic para-
digm from one of import-substituting industrialization and corporatism, which was
formed under the Peron government, to one of market and “delegative democracy.”11
However, those major trends and factors are not unique to Argentina, but are com-
mon to almost all Latin American countries, as mentioned in the Introduction.
Social security reform in Argentina in the 1990s, though in line with the above-
mentioned common trend of the Latin American countries, was also characterized
by the following unique features: the social insurance and labor reforms in the
1990s, on one hand, were a response to neoliberal economic policy as illustrated by
partial privatization of the pension system and the optional system of health insur-
ance, but they retained, on the other hand, a certain continuity with the traditional
system of social insurance and the collective negotiation system. The Menem Peronist
government, which promoted the reforms, demonstrated some similarity with
delegative democracy as propounded by O’Donnell in the sense that the president,
who was elected in a democratic manner, promoted reforms by exercising powerful
administrative authority incomparable with that of any other agency. At the same
time, social insurance and labor reforms were affected by the legacy of corporatism
of the Peronist Party,12 with its links to trade unions, which, though weakened, still
constituted the biggest support organization of the government. This is the very
reason for the continuation of the traditional system in social insurance and labor
legislation in Argentina as contrasted with economic liberalization. This transfor-
grasped as the welfare regime and its cluster, and welfare state as a social security regime and the
aggregate political and economic paradigms that helped its formation.
11 There are many definitions of democracy, and “democracy” here is used in the sense of democracy
containing elements of O’Donnell’s delegative democracy.
12 Panizza (2001) uses the term “old politics” to describe this legacy of corporatism of the Peronist
Party.
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mation of Argentine’s welfare state can be described as a shift from a limited con-
servative corporatist welfare state (Figure 2.A), to market-oriented conservative
corporatist welfare state (Figure 2.B).
Despite the fact that the above-mentioned social security reforms were partially
prompted by the fiscal deficit in the 1980s, in the 1990s social expenditures were
rising trend-wise vis-à-vis economic expenditures (de Flood 1999, p. 47). This is
partly because the pay-as-you-go pension debt was borne by the state in the pen-
sion system reform, and also because the protection for the vulnerable, i.e., social
assistance, became increasingly important in the midst of the move to a market
economy. It involved the dual characters of traditional “political clientelism” and
familism on one hand, and the expanding domain of participation of civil society
represented by NGOs on the other. How civil society will develop and what roles it
can play in the Argentine welfare, a country moving rapidly toward the market
economy, is one of the important subjects for future research.
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APPENDIX TABLE
CHRONOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM OF ARGENTINA
Year Politics Social Security
1916 Yrigoyen Radical government
1922 Alvear Radical government
1928 Yrigoyen Radical government
1930 Coup d’état, military government and
conservative government
1944 Pension for commercial workers
1946 Peron Peronist government Pension for industrial workers
1954 Pension for self-employed and agricultural
workers
1955 Coup d’état, military government Accident compensation insurance for all
employees
1956 Pension for all workers
1957 Family allowance for commercial and indus-
trial workers
1958 Frondizi Radical government
1962 Coup d’état, military government
1963 Illia Radical government
1966 Coup d’état, military government
1967 Integration of pension systems
1970 Health insurance for all employees
1973 Peron and Isabel Peron Peronist
government
1976 Coup d’état, military government
1983 Shift to civilian rule, Alfonnsin Radical  Integral protection for handicapped persons
government
1989 Menem Peronist government
1991 Employment Law
1993 Partial privatization of pension system
1995 Menem Peronist government II
1996 Reform of family allowance system
1997 Reform of health insurance
1999 De la Rua Alliance government
2001 Financial crisis
2002 Duarde Peronist government
Sources: Compiled by the author based on Nakagawa, Matsushita, and Osonoi (1985) and
Usami (2001b, chap. 7).
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